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DOES INEQUALITY HARM DEMOCRACY? 




This paper presents an empirical investigation about the effect of increasing economic inequality on 
some aspects of the quality of a democracy. The main novelty of the paper lies in its methodology: it 
applies to a single country - the UK – in a long run perspective. Using Eurobarometer data for the period 
1974-2009, we select three questions and check whether an increase in inequality alters the answers to 
these questions, subject to other control variables. In particular, as indicators of the quality of 
democracy, we select the degree of Democracy-Satisfaction, the frequency of Political Discussion and 
Participation in Election. Another novelty is the use of several measures of inequality: the Gini 
coefficient, the Foster-Wolfson polarization index, the interdecile ratios P90/P10 and P90/P50, the 
shares of top and bottom 1%, 5% and 10% income. Inequality indices have been computed using two 
British household budget/expenditure surveys, i.e. the Family Expenditure Survey and the Family 
Resources Survey. Using an array of indicators allows us to disentangle what happens in the different 
parts of the income distribution and to avoid the dependence of the results on the choice of the 
indicator. The estimation is carried out estimating probit and ordered probit models. The main finding is 
that higher level of income inequality, no matter how it is measured, impacts negatively on citizens’ 
satisfaction with democracy and positively on their political discussion and intention to vote. This leads 
to the issue of limiting inequality as an engine of deterioration in the quality of democracy, and 
sustaining an active citizenship. 
 
Keywords 





In western advanced economies the reduction in income inequality has been sharp and 
general since the 1st World War. Data for the period post WWII-1970s still support the 
Kuznet’s vision of an inverse-U relationship between development and inequality, but after 
the 1970s a sharp reversal of that equalizing tendency started to be the rule. Income 
inequality increased both in boom and recession and widened in the two decades since the 
mid-1980s. In the late 2000s the majority of OECD countries were experiencing high Gini 
coefficients: the English speaking area – notably the US and the UK – and several European 
countries were ranging from the minimum of 0.30 for the Netherlands to the maximum of 
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0.41 for the US in the 2000-2010 period, while Northern Europe (Scandinavian block first) 
and Japan positioned on average well below 0.30, which is considered a “very good Gini” 
(Stepan and Linz, 2011, p. 847 and 854). Moreover, English-speaking countries have been 
showing another peculiarity: in US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Ireland the share 
of top 1% in total income before tax is U-shaped with the rising portion appearing after the 
1970s (while the continental Europe - precisely France, Germany, Netherlands, and 
Switzerland - exhibits an L-shaped form). Both aspects - the fact that inequality in the 
majority of the western economies is increasing and that there is a huge disproportion 
between the top and the remaining of the distribution - started to be recognized as a social 
problem. 
 
This seems particularly true when considering that social mobility shrank in some countries 
of the first group: the correlation between sons’ and fathers’ incomes in 2005 was sensibly 
higher in the US and the UK than in Germany and Scandinavian countries: “broadly, social 
mobility in the UK seems to have fallen from North European to something close to US level” 
(Glyn, 2006, p. 174); the probability for the son of being in the same earnings quintile as his 
father is substantially higher in both the 1st and 5th quintile in the US and in the UK than in 
the Scandinavian group where the probability is smaller and equally distributed (OCSE, 2008, 
p. 206); the correlation between this intergenerational income elasticity and income 
inequality – the so called “Great Gatsby Curve” (Krueger, 2012) – is high, and it is still the US 
and the UK to perform the worst; lastly, whilst a reliable measure of social disease - the 
index of health and social problems elaborated by Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) - barely 
shows any relationship with the per-capita national income in rich countries, it appears 
strongly related to inequality. Thus, there is a piece of evidence that where income 
differences are bigger, social distances are bigger and social stratification more remarkable. 
The social distance among population-groups can become enormous and it can lead to social 
exclusion through differences in consumption sphere, in health and housing conditions, in 
access to education and to labor market, and in the social-relation network. A harmful 
environment for the attractiveness of the democratic institutions to their citizens might 
easily develop. 
 
The difficulties to a correct working of democracy when population is divided by income and 
wealth are widely dealt with in the political science (and also sociology) literature4. Since 
Aristotle, the scholars of politics have theorized that the proper functioning of a democracy 
depends on a relatively equal distribution of economic resources. For all, Tocqueville stated 
that the degree of equality is the best predictor of democracy stability, and of the quality 
itself of democracy. More recently, Dahl (1971, 2000) reminds that economic resources 
easily become political resources and that an unequal distribution can generate frustration 
and can reduce the sense of community and legitimacy leading to a subtle deterioration of 
democracy. For our mature western democracies an appreciable degree of income 
inequality is not as dangerous as in provoking dramatic outcomes. Movements of de-
democratization rather occur within the democratic regime inducing a failure in the proper 
functioning of institutions that eventually leads to a deterioration of trust and to an 
estrangement from participation. The trend of de-participation leaves empty spaces that 
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may well lead to an oligarchic power (in the specific case of a wealth-driven power, the 
plutarchy, in the Hacker-Pierson terminology, or plutonomy elsewhere), or to a power that is 
centered more and more on the interest of the few. The desire to keep privileges can favor 
the partial restriction of an open democracy (Winters, 2011). 
 
The quantitative literature concerning the effects of inequality on democracy is very scant 
and it is not centered on the idea of testing the quality of democracy, with few exceptions 
(Sunde et al., 2007; Solt, 2004, 2008; Anderson and Beramendi, 2008) considering an array 
of countries. Our paper joins these contributions in so far as it aims precisely at evaluating 
the quality of democracy. More specifically, we first test how inequality impacts on citizens’ 
satisfaction, which is a suitable indicator for the concept of “responsiveness” (Diamond and 
Merlino, 2004, p. 27). Then, we inquire about the citizen’s reaction towards two of the main 
characteristics of political life: participating in discussion and voting. In addition, we depart 
from the existing literature which performs cross-country analysis either on developing 
countries or on a mix of developing-developed ones.5 We are not interested in a worldwide 
comparison because developing countries differ in fundamental ways from the developed 
ones, and democracies in transition have to be studied separately as well. Even within the 
universe of the developed countries with fully grounded democracy things are different: the 
kind and the reach of policies, their timing, the country-specific social norms and institutions, 
their position in the global economic context and so on. In fact, “…. our results suggest that 
inequality is determined by factors which differ substantially across countries” (Li, Squire and 
Zou, 1998, p. 27). This statement – based on a wide empirical evidence – implies that income 
inequality depends on the country-specific socio-politico-economic framework, which is 
sluggish to change, and it reflects the fact that the drivers of income inequality (changes in 
demography and living arrangements, labor market trends and government re-distribution, 
in primis) have varied sensibly across OECD countries: no single story holds for all. How could 
the effect on democracy – intended as citizens’ reaction vis-à-vis institutions – be the same? 
 
Thus, this paper will concentrate on a well grounded democratic country only, with a rich 
advanced economy, performing a time-series analysis for the last thirty years through the 
pooling of cross-section survey-data for the period 1974-2009. The country chosen is the UK 
on the basis of the following criteria: i) both the US and the UK have recently experienced an 
exacerbation in inequality but the income composition at the very top is less earnings - than 
wealth-based in the UK, making the fashionable top-incomes problem less relevant; ii) UK is 
a country with higher taxation level and that redistributes more than the US; iii) UK is the 
country that invented the modern Welfare State and is a country with an historical level of 
inequality much lower than the U.S. 
 
Last but not least, we do not limit ourselves to the Gini index only as “the” indicator of 
inequality and we use several additional indicators. Our purpose is twofold: disentangling 
what happens in different parts of the income distribution and avoiding the dependence of 
the results on the choice of the used indicator. 
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The paper is organized as follows: the data and their sources, the variables and the model 
are illustrated; the results of the empirical investigation are provided and commented. 
Concluding remarks briefly summarize the findings. 
 
 
2. Data sources and variables 
 
The Eurobarometer Survey was used for the “quality of democracy” variables since it is the 
only survey that covers the whole time period we are interested in. As for income inequality, 
we computed inequality of household equivalent disposable income for the period 1971-
2009 using Family Expenditure Survey (FES) and Family Resources Survey (FRS). 
 
 
2.1. Dependent variables 
 
As possible indicators of the quality of democracy we selected the three following questions: 
 Democracy-Satisfaction. It corresponds to Eurobarometer question “on the whole, 
are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the 
way democracy works in your country?”. 
 Political Discussion. This is the answer to the question: “when you get together with 
friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or 
never?” 
 Participation in Elections. This variable is built from the question: “if there were a 
general election tomorrow, which party would you support?” 
 
 
2.2. Inequality indices 
 
Several inequality indices have been computed using the above mentioned British household 
budget/expenditure surveys. In theory, different indicators can tell a different story on 
inequality and should they show different trends findings might be entirely due to the index 
choice. This is why no choice has been made and ten distinct indicators were calculated and 
used. 
 
In addition to the well-known Gini coefficient, we computed the interdecile ratios P90/P10 
and P90/P50, the share of the top 1%, 5% and 10%, the share of the bottom 1%, 5% and 10%, 
and  the Foster-Wolfson polarization index, which is “… a Gini-like index measure of 
bipolarization based on the curve.....[that] indicates how far each population percentile’s 
income is from the median income” (Lambert, 2010, p. 241). 
 
The ten indices are highly correlated (results are available from the authors on request), all 
telling the same story about inequality in UK: income distribution has been relatively stable 
during the 1970s, then there was a sharp increase in inequality from late 1970s to the early 
1990s followed by an up and down movement without any of the dramatic changes seen in 
the past. 
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This same high correlation suggests that they may be expression of the same latent 
construct, a concept used in factor analysis, that is reflected into observable indicators. The 
latent construct can thus be interpreted as the inequality imperfectly measured by different 
indicators that are rough and partial realizations of a higher level concept (Bollen and 
Lennox, 1991; Edwards and Bagozzi, 2000). Using factor analysis, we are able to find (and 
measure) the latent variable lying behind (results of the factor analysis are available from 
the authors on request). In the progress of the paper we will mainly focus on this variable - 
duly standardized - that we simply call Inequality - leaning on the other inequality indices for 




2.3. Control variables 
 
Personal and household characteristics were considered as control variables: age, education 
(university and secondary degree vs. lower educational level), gender (male vs. female), 
marital status (married vs. other marital status such as being single, divorced or widow). 
Additionally, we included information on occupational status: self-employed or 
entrepreneur, manager, white collar, manual worker, retired from work, unemployed, each 
vs. the group of non-active people (including individuals in the military service, individuals 
who are responsible for house-caring or people who do not work but are not recorded as 
unemployed). A dummy variable captures differences between individuals living in an urban 
area vs. individuals living in a rural area. Also a time trend year and a dummy distinguishing 
between the two pieces of the UK where the person interviewed lives (Great Britain vs. 
Northern Ireland) have been included. At a later stage of the analysis, also household income 
deciles will be included in the analysis. 
 
 
3. The model 
 
We estimated three distinct equations, one for each dependent variable. Due to the nature 
of data, Democracy-Satisfaction and Political Discussion have been analyzed using ordered 
probit models, whilst Participation in Elections was treated with a probit. In particular, 
Democracy-Satisfaction is an ordinal variable, recoded from a descendant into an ascendant 
scale, taking value 1 if “Not at all satisfied”, 2 if “Not very satisfied”, 3 if “Fairly satisfied” and 
4 if “Very satisfied”. Political Discussion takes different values according to how often the 
interviewed discusses about politics. Recoded into a convenient way, it takes values: 1 if 
“Never“; 2 if “Occasionally”; 3 if “Frequently”. Participation in Elections has been recoded to 
take value 1 if “Would vote” and 0 otherwise (“Would not vote/I would blank or spoil my 







































The three models were estimated for each inequality indicator, however, we show the entire 
estimated equation only where the main inequality indicator (table 1) is present. For the ten 
remaining inequality indices we present only the coefficient attached to the specified 





The first important result is that an increase in the level of Inequality depresses Democracy-
Satisfaction (first column of table 1). The hypothesis that growing Inequality has a negative 
effect on the perception of democracy quality is, therefore, confirmed. 
 
In addition, we find that Democracy-Satisfaction increases with age (ageing people become 
wiser, or more indulgent, or more tolerant); males are more satisfied with democracy than 
women and married people more than individuals in another marital status (do women and 
singles have a greater sense of moral justice? Do they have more complaints against 
institutions that take care of them less than of others?); satisfaction increases with 
education - having university or a secondary degree vs. having a lower than secondary 
degree - and it is greater for more educated people (education helps in evaluating 
democracy and its virtues?). Also living in Great Britain vs. living in Northern Ireland 
positively and significantly impacts on Democracy-Satisfaction, while living in an urban area 
negatively affects Democracy-Satisfaction (cities present more occasions to interact with 
institutions than the country side does?). There exists a positive time-trend in the probability 
of being satisfied with democracy. The coefficients relative to the various types of 
employment position tell us the different probability that self-employed, managers, white 
collars, manual workers, retired from work and unemployed are more satisfied by 
democracy with respect to the control group: the non-actives. In particular, we find that 
managers and white collars are more satisfied with democracy with respect to the non-
actives, while the opposite is found for manual workers and unemployed (who represent 
less-protected categories). On the contrary, self-employed and retired from work do not 
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  Democracy-Satisfaction Political Discussion Participation in Elections 
Inequality -0.078* 0.028* 0.092* 
 
(0.011) (0.009) (0.022) 
Age 0.003* 0.008* 0.009* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Male 0.036* 0.248* 0.025 
 
(0.012) (0.010) (0.023) 
Married 0.052* 0.121* 0.139* 
 
(0.012) (0.010) (0.022) 
University degree 0.149* 0.597* 0.254* 
 
(0.019) (0.016) (0.042) 
Secondary degree 0.135* 0.172* 0.093* 
 
(0.013) (0.011) (0.025) 
Self employed/entrepr. 0.007 0.317* -0.025 
 
(0.025) (0.021) (0.047) 
Manager 0.090* 0.365* 0.166* 
 
(0.024) (0.020) (0.051) 
White collar 0.065* 0.232* 0.103* 
 
(0.018) (0.016) (0.035) 
Manual worker -0.042* 0.026 -0.005 
 
(0.018) (0.016) (0.032) 
Retired  0.014 0.051* 0.050 
 
(0.022) (0.018) (0.042) 
Unemployed -0.247* -0.003 -0.105* 
 
(0.028) (0.023) (0.044) 
Urban -0.067* 0.072* -0.014 
 
(0.011) (0.009) (0.022) 
Year 0.009* -0.010* -0.028* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Great Britain 0.477* 0.122* 0.465* 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.020) 
Threshold 1/Constant 17.564* -18.931* -55.898* 
 
(2.175) (1.690) (4.633) 




 Threshold 3 20.040* 
    (2.176) 
  Obs 60699 93631 52461 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05 
 
Table 1: Estimation results of ordered probit and probit models on Democracy-Satisfaction, Political Discussion 
and Participation in Elections (elaborations on Eurobarometer data) 
 
 
4.2. Political Discussion 
 
The second column of table 1 presents the results of the model for Political Discussion, 
showing that it is significantly augmented by an increase in Inequality. Relying on the 
precedent result on Democracy-Satisfaction, the discontent about the quality of democracy 
induced by an increase in Inequality does not turn into any reduction in political 
participation. On the contrary, it appears to nourish a more lively Political Discussion. 
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Significant coefficients are also found for almost all regressors: age, being male, being 
married, having a university or secondary degree, living in an urban area, living in Great 
Britain, all increase the frequency of talking about politics. It seems again that experience 
and social status helps being more involved with the surrounding world, while the gender-
result reaffirms that it is not in women habits to talk about politics. The time trend has a 
negative coefficient, implying that Political Discussion today is not as frequent as in the past. 
The occupational status variables suggest that people in all occupational categories but 
unemployed are significantly more likely than non-actives to talk more frequently about 
politics. Contrarily to the previous question where the Democracy-Satisfaction was 
dependent on the working conditions, here the results are uniform: does having a job let 
everybody feel part of a community? Does it suggest that Political Discussion might be useful 
in one’s own job-space? Does having a job just simply provide more opportunities for 
Political Discussion? 
 
  Democracy-Satisfaction Political Discussion Participation in Elections  
Inequality -0.078* 0.028* 0.092* 
 
(0.011) (0.009) (0.022)  
Gini coefficient  -1.925* 0.689* 2.384* 
 
(0.265) (0.222) (0.556)  
Foster-Wolfson index -2.918* 0.981* 2.169* 
 
(0.285) (0.234) (0.606)  
Interdecile ratio P90/P10  -0.147* 0.047* 0.106* 
 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.032)  
Interdecile ratio P90/P50 -0.595* 0.278* 0.615* 
 
(0.075) (0.063) (0.156)  
Share top 1%  0.045 0.028 2.864* 
 
(0.565) (0.484) (1.123)  
Share top 5%  -1.776* 0.666 3.383* 
 
(0.455) (0.392) (0.932)  
Share top 10%  -2.073* 0.827* 3.257* 
 
(0.407) (0.349) (0.844)  
Share bottom 1%  349.047* -66.771* -97.847  
 
(33.642) (30.259) (67.628)  
Share bottom 5%  37.248* -12.823* -33.853* 
 
(4.025) (3.496) (8.110)  
Share bottom 10%  15.063* -4.998* -13.198* 
  (1.656) (1.399) (3.368)  
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05 
 
Table 2: Estimated coefficients of the 11 inequality indices (elaborations on Eurobarometer data) 
 
 
4.3. Participation in Elections 
 
The third column of table 1 shows the results of the probit model on the probability of 
voting if there were a general election tomorrow. Again, a positive effect of Inequality on 
political participation is confirmed here: an increase in Inequality significantly increases the 
probability of voting. 
In addition, we find that increasing age, being married, having a higher educational level, 
and living in Great Britain increases significantly the probability of electoral participation 
(results are on average highly consistent with the previous ones). The time trend has a 
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negative coefficient, suggesting that, other things being equal, Participation in Elections in 
UK is decreasing with time (as it was the Political Discussion attitude). 
 
No statistically significant effect is found for being male and living in an urban area. On the 
contrary, occupational status impacts electoral participation: managers and white collars are 
more likely to vote than non-actives, whilst the opposite is true for the unemployed (here 
again the results are consistent with the previous ones). No significant coefficient in found 
for the other occupational categories. 
 
As anticipated, we run the three models with the ten alternative indicators, starting with the 
traditional Gini coefficient, in order to check whether the results were robust along the 
entire distribution and its main parts as well (table 2). Our main Inequality indicator is 
presented again in the first row for the sake of comparison. No statistically significant result 
clashes with our first evidence: where significant, all indicators tell us the same story: an 
increase in inequality, no matter how it is measured, reduces the level of Democracy-
Satisfaction, while increasing Political Discussion and Participation in Elections. 
 
 
5. Does income matter? 
 
Though moral aversion to inequality may, in theory, be distributed roughly uniformly across 
income levels, it may reasonably be argued that, with growing inequality, the riches are 
better off than the poor and, therefore, the actual attitude is likely to differ for persons lying 
in different points of income distribution. In order to investigate this feature - in line with 
Solt - we estimated the three models (for Democracy-Satisfaction, Political Discussion and 
Participation in Elections) running separate regression models separately by income quintile. 
Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients related to Inequality for the different quintiles and 
the different equations. Only in the case of Democracy-Satisfaction there is a clear pattern. 
The effect of inequality on Democracy-Satisfaction is negative at all levels of income, though 
not statistically significant for the richest group, and it decreases in absolute value from the 
poorest to the richest group. This suggests that the frustrating effect of income inequality is 
particularly felt by the poorest individuals. As regards Political Discussion, we find a positive 
and significant effect of Inequality for every level of income, and this effect is higher for the 
poorest and the richest quintile, suggesting that these two groups are the ones more 
concerned about their interests. The effect of Inequality on Participation in Election appears 












Democracy-Satisfaction -0.218* -0.191* -0.157* -0.110* -0.038  
 
(0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.041) (0.043)  
Political Discussion 0.187* 0.119* 0.094* 0.104* 0.153* 
 
(0.036) (0.039) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037)  
Electoral participation 0.072 0.030 0.157* -0.010 0.186* 
  (0.072) (0.074) (0.077) (0.077) (0.075)  
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05 
Table 3: Estimated coefficients of  Inequality on the three variables by income quintile (elaborations on 
Eurobarometer data) 
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The results are fairly poor. We think that this is due to several drawbacks in the 
Eurobarometer income-variable. The first problem is that data source does not collect all the 
information needed for calculating household equivalized income. The second concerns the 
number of available survey rounds: income has been collected only until 2004, shortening 
the time span of our analysis. Thirdly, household income has many missing observations: 
whether the non-response is not purely random, as it is often the case, a problem of 
selection bias arises. Fourthly, income is not reported as such but it is collected in classes 
that differ in size and number from year to year. In order to create an ordinal income class 
variable, we have to assume that it is uniformly distributed within classes. Lastly, the 
concept of income used here is not disposable income, but gross income, which includes 





As far as we know, this paper is the first one which relates income inequality – measured 
through a wide array of indicators – to some aspects of the quality of a democracy in an 
advanced-economy-and-rooted-democracy country, in a long-run perspective. 
 
We tested the impact of inequality on three indicators of the quality of democracy: citizens’ 
satisfaction and citizens’ attitude to participation in the two aspects of political discussion 
and intention to voting. 
 
Our findings reveal that Inequality decreases citizens’ satisfaction and stimulates 
participation. This result seems quite interesting since the second and third indicator of 
quality move in opposite directions with respect to the first. However, this is not an 
inconsistent outcome in so far as it tells us that when a discontent occurs a positive reaction 
originates, which is debated in the political theory as one of the two possible outcomes (Solt, 
2008, pp. 48-49). Contrarily to elsewhere found (Solt 2008) this may be due to the fact that 
we focus on a single country only with a fully rooted democracy rather than a pool of 
countries. Thus, the problem we are facing in such an environment might be the persistence 
of dissatisfaction – the degree of Inequality – and the efficacy of citizens’ reaction rather 
than the reaction to the dissatisfaction as such. This leads to the issue of limiting inequality 
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